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Abstract 
An analogous voice privacy system was developed using a single ~M.S32?10. DSP pro,ces-
soI. The system is used for encrypting of human voice and transmlttmg It Vla a stanaard 
analogous telephone channel without frame synchronization. The full duplex system was 
implemented on a single EU printed circuit board. 
J( eywords: voice privacy system, speech transmission, voice encryption. 
Introduction 
Voice encryption has already a four-decade history (see DIFFIE and HELLMA:-"'N 
(1979»). The first approaches 'were based on analogous methods, of course. 
A typical system splits the input speech into about .5 bands and then het-
erodyned them into other bands according to the permutation key. The key 
space was very small: 51 = 120. Rolling code scramblers changed the key 
several times a second and inverted some of the bands according to a pseu-
dorandom sequence generated by using the key as a seed. These systems 
were still breakable, because the speech spectrum does not change abruptly 
and a band could be tracked during changing the permutation. 
Time division scramblers make the scrambling procedure in time do-
main and their key space can be very large but have an impractically large 
transmission delay at the same time. 
The methods used nowadays through analogous telephone lines fall 
into two categories. The first uses a low bit rate speech quantizer followed 
by a sophisticated data encrypter and a modem. But the speech quality 
achieved at these rates (1200-2400 bps) is not good enough. It still has 
some losses in intelligibility and naturality. 
The second category we used is caBed sample based scrambling. The 
*On leave from Research Institute for Telecommunication. 
136 F. MARX 
digitized speech vector is transformed into a certain transform domain, per-
muted, invei'sely transformed and transmitted in analogous form. 
Sample Based Scrambling 
The transformation used for speech encryption is expected 
IS to be orthogonal (i.e. not to enhance the noise on decrypting) 
8 to leave bandlimited speech bandlimited 
, to be computationally efficient 
il to eliminate the need of any synchronization between the transmitter 
and the receiver. 
WTh""ER (1979) proposed a new concept of using discrete prolate spher-
oidal sequences as a basis of the transformation. Using them the degree of 
security improved tremendously due to the much lower residual intelligibility 
and much larger key space size and the fact that the transform domain is not 
in connection with any physical feature of the speech. Unfortunately, the 
problem of frame synchronization remains untouched. Another price paid 
for these good properties is that the factorization of the transformation 
matrix has not been solved yet, so this system has not been implemented in 
real-time due to its relatively high computational complexity. 
To overcome the above limitations a new frequency domain scrambling 
system was investigated by LEE and CEm; (1986) in which the short-time 
Fourier analysis-synthesis is used. 
Short-Time Fourier Analysis-Synthesis 
The analysis by definition in discrete time and discrete frequency is 
00 
Xn(k)= L h(n-m)·x(m)·exp(-j·27i·k·m/N) O::;k::;N-l (1) 
m=-co 
where x( n) is the input sequence, h( n) is the impulse response of a low-pass 
filter, n is the time index and k is the frequency index. It can be interpreted 
(see PORTNOFF (1980)) at fixed k as a dovv'1l-converted output sequence from 
a band-pass filter with centre frequency 27ik/N. 
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Supposing that h( n) is finite in time and observing the fact that 
exp (- j27ikmjN) is periodic in m with period N, one can simplify the ex-
pression Eq. (1) by defining un(q) : 
L-l 
un(q) = L x (n + N . r + q). h (-N· r - q) 0 ~ q ~ N - 1 (2) 
r=-L 
;V-I 
Xn(k) = L un(q) . exp (-j. 27i' k· q/N) o ~ k ~ N - 1 (3) 
q=O 
where Eq. (3) is exactly of the form of an N-point DFT. 
The two expressions describe an N band filter bank which can effi-
ciently be calculated by means of an FFT algorithm. Since all the Xn(k) 
sequences have the bandwidth 7i j N, they can adequately be described by 
sample values at the period N. The synthesis part is 
1 N-l (X) 
x(n)= N L L f(n-s·N),Xk(s·N)·exp(j·27i·n·kjN) (4) 
- 1.=0 s=-oo 
where f( n) is the impulse response of an interpolating filter. 
-Using the same idea (see PORTNOFF (1980)) as in Eq. (1), Eq. (4) can 
be replaced by 
N-l ~ L Xs.N(k) . exp (j . 27i . k . ijN) 
1.=0 
( . \ Vn z/ { Ys.N( i) ,n = s . N o ,nl=-s·N 
n+L·N-l 
x(n) = L vm(n)·f(n-m) 
m=n-L·N 
In Eq. (.5), the form of an inverse DFT appears. 
s = 1,2, 
(05) 
(6) 
(7) 
Now Fig. 1 shows the new scrambling algorithm. Block PI performs 
expression Eq. (2), P2 performs Eq. (6) and Eq. (7). M is a scrambling 
matrix which permutes Xn(k) into an encrypted version. The descrambling 
process in the receiver is exactly the same except M is replaced by its inverse 
M-I. 
The method uses Fourier basis which is complex. Therefore, the scram-
bled speech will be complex in general. To keep it real, matrix M must save 
the complex conjugate symmetry in Xn(k) LEE and CH OD (1986). 
There is another property M must dispose of. Existing analogous 
telephone channels have the bandwidth 0.3 - 3.4 kHz, while Xn(k) has 
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Tro:1smitter 
x(n) _===~_ 
Receiver 
Fig. 1. Block diagram of the scrambling system 
information about the band 0-4 kHz at the usual sampling frequency 8 kHz. 
So M must not change the samples of Xn(k) corresponding to the bands 
0- 0.3 kHz and 3.4 - -1 kHz. It means that the corresponding submatrices 
must be identity matrices. 
\Vhy synchronization is not required? Assume the receiver is out of 
frame synchronization by r samples. It means that while the transmitter 
calculates the Xk(S . N) samples, the receiver has the Xk(S . N + r) ones. 
However, the sequence can be described by its samples at period iV, no 
matter whether these samples are given at the moments s·N or s·N +r. The 
synchronization error introduces only a linear phase error which becomes a 
random phase error during the operation with M-I. Fortunately, human 
ears are not sensitive to phase distortion at all. 
Hardware and Software Considerations 
A single TMS32010 digital signal processor is used to implement the encryp-
tion system. The hardware consists of the processor, of its 4 kword program 
ROM, of an additional 2 kword data RAM, of the AID D I A converters 
and auxiliary elements. The frame length is chosen to be 128 and the filter 
length is 6 X 128. The 6 X 128 samples of the input sequence are stored in 
the outer RAM and so are the output samples. An interrupt routine is used 
to handle the input-output operations. 
The most important part of the program is how to calculate the DFT. 
A time efficient radix-4 FFT algorithm is used for this purpose (KOCSIS and 
MARX (1987)) as the most suitable one on this processor. Because of straight-
line coding the same routine must perform the inverse transformation. For-
tunately it can be fulfilled by taking into account the reversed indexing of 
output points on inverse operation. 
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To increase the degree of security the permutation changes in every 
256 msec. The permutation matrices are calculated from the output of a 
pseudorandom generator stepped in every 256 msec. In the first version of 
the program a simple shift register with feed-back was used as a random 
generator. But it is known that it can be broken by knowing its twice 
as long output sequence as the register length itself. The DES (DATA 
ENCRYPTION STANDARD) algorithm is implemented in feed-back mode 
instead. There is no enough memory for the DES in the basic ROM so it 
must be extended using paging technique. 
Because of using variable permutation, the synchronization of the pseu-
dorandom generators in the transmitter and the receiver is needed. For this, 
the transmitter begins its work with transmitting a synchronization tone. 
According to the experiences this single operation is enough to keep the 
receiver synchronous during a telephone call. Storage requirement and exe-
cution time can be seen on Table 1. 
Table 1 Time and storage requirements 
Routines Prog. memo [word] Exec. time [ms] 
I/O op. 23 0.58 
PI and P 2 110 2 x 2.8 
DFT, IDFT 2730 2 x 0.83 
Permut. 340 0.21 
DES 1460 1.96 
Total 5083, inc. tables 10.01 
Experiences, Conclusions 
The residual intelligibility test (LEE and CHOD (1986)) has resulted in 13% 
average digit intelligibility using Hungarian language (the theoretically best 
one is 10%). The standard deviation of the test was about 4%. The speech 
quality is quite good but there is a little crack at permutation change. 
Some authors consider DES breakable with an exhaustive search in an 
acceptable time. But in data encryption the situation is quite different. The 
plain text and encrypted text are well defined so they can be a source for a 
search if they are both known or supposed. Here, in speech encryption there 
is only a little chance to know both the source speech and the corresponding 
encrypted speech exactly (!) at the same time. And how can a computer de-
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cide whether it has found exactly the right source speech sequence, because 
it is not the problem of speech recognition but of a much more difficult one. 
The key is only given in the case of exact decryption, so exhaustive search 
by a computer is more difficult then in data encryption. Because of these 
reasons we consider DES a good choice in speech encryption. 
Further experiments are needed to check the system through real tele-
phone lines. 
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